Strategic Autonomy and Ukraine
In this contribution, the widely discussed concept of strategic autonomy is tackled from the perspective of its evolution according to the last political developments (Von Der Leyen Commission 2019-2024, and the new political priorities of the second mandate of Von Der Leyen), where it was discussed what role plays Ukraine in this concept.
The concept of strategic autonomy has been long discussed in the European panorama, both institutionally in the literature (Howorth, 2019; Lippert, Von Ondarza, Volker, 2019; Pauli Järvenpää, Claudia Major, Sven Sakkov, 2019; Brustlein, 2018, Borrell, 2020, EEAS, 2020, European Parliament 2022).
However, the notion, far from being well defined, constitutes certainly an agenda setting especially for the EU standing in the global arena. Overall, as the previous High Representative of the EU stated, strategic autonomy is the “capacity to act autonomously when and where necessary and with partners wherever possible”. (Borrel, 2020).
Surely, the first Ursula Von Der Leyen’s Commission mandate has embodied the concept of strategic autonomy in her priorities (European Parliament 2024, Hakansson 2024, Beaucillon 2023) however, although with Biden’s election, its importance fade away, the post-2020 Europe in polycrises (Covid-19, Russian invasion of Ukraine, migration, energy, etc.) showed that “Strategic autonomy has been widened to new subjects of an economic and technological nature” (Borrel, 2020). The concept started to be connected to a new awareness of a “changed world” (Borrel, 2020), and to the fact that the a political Union with a geopolitical Commission aiming at being a global player should also be autonomous.
For this reason, now the concept does not only decline in defence and security, it has been extended in the other EU areas such as investments and trade, for avoiding unfair competition by foreign power, such as China.
Against this background, what is the role of Ukraine within this framework?
Ukraine seems to represent a factor rather than an actor. It was the invasion of Ukraine that gave an impetus to rethink and reinforce the concept (Beaucillon, Montaldo, 2023) with regard to the return to unilateralism in place of multilateralism. Ukraine is explained as an case-study where the EU has assumed a certain external standing vis-à-vis its allies (Beaucillon, 2023), and the war has contributed surely to reinforce the Commission’s role within the policy field of security and defence (Hakansson 2024). It is argued that “the Commission’s ambition to become a geopolitical Commission has been reinforced by external events and crises” (Hakansson 2024). As a consequence of this crises, some countries have been benefitting because of the relaxion of certain important rules, such as state aid (this is the case of France and Germany that received around 75 per cent of the total state aid approved by the Commission (Clean Energy Wire 2023; Euronews 2023).
Despite so far the EU seems to be at a “Demosthenes Moment in Europe” (Egmont 2023) or face the dilemma “Pourquoi mourir pour Dantzig”? or the Donbass (IRIS 2024; CEPA 2024), Ukraine does not seem to be part of its strategic autonomy, rather the justification or the legitimization for it. “Today, the question is not even whether European or Americans should “die for Donbas”. It is rather, if we are willing to provide the assistance needed to help Ukrainians stop dying for Donbas – and the rest of their country” as Borrell declared in its speech Georgetown University in March (Borrell, 2024).
However, although not apparent in the field of defence and security, Ukraine does play a role in the wide framework of strategic autonomy. If one considers that this concept is strictly related to the geopolitical standing of the Commission, then one field where this element played an important role is enlargement. Enlargement is considered a geopolitical investment in peace and security as Charles Michel (President of the European Council) affirmed during his speech for the 20th anniversary of the 2004 EU enlargement (European Council 2024). For this reason, Ukraine becomes not an actor, but an object of enlargement as a goal within the strategic autonomy, triggered by the Russian invasion of that country. And it is true that Ukraine does not alone constitute an actor because not only Ukraine, but also Moldova, Georgia and Western Balkans became a priority (Anghel, Jones 2024, European Parliament 2023). So geopolitics meet integration (Lippert 2024, European Democracy Hub 2024).
Finally, looking at the future, with the results of this year elections that gave a second mandate to Ursula Von Der Leyen, are strategic autonomy, geopolitics and enlargement still linked? And what is the place for Ukraine?
When assessing the Political Guidelines 2024-2029 of Ursula Von der Leyen, it is possible to observe that enlargement is a geopolitical imperative. Von der Leyen established that it is a “moral, political and geostrategic imperative to further complete our Union”. In this framework, Ukraine becomes relevant in the field of defence and security, where she states that “Ukraine is fighting for Europe’s freedom, democracy and values. […] Our collective resolve must be as strong as the challenge is great. The best investment in European security is investing in the security of Ukraine”. In this sense, some signals seem to show a small shift in the importance of Ukraine from a factor to an actor used to lead by example, “Ukraine is fighting for our freedom every day – and we must work for its freedom too”. Ukraine constitutes then a priority for a global Europe ambition, as an entire chapter is dedicated to showing the actions of the EU in the world with the view of “leveraging the power, and partnership”.
However, a fundamental political shift does not seem to have changed so far, and with the policy adopted at the moment. Only by looking at the various mission letters of each commissioner-designate, that are relevant given the role of this executive branch of the EU in order to push and change policies, the Ukraine’s role and importance is found solely in the mission letter of Mrs Marta Kos, Commissioner-designate for enlargement. It confirms a relation with other wider objectives that have been highlighted in this brief contribution. A part of the commitment on the “continued and sustained support of Ukraine”, the Commission wants to ensure that Ukraine’s accession and reconstruction paths are fully integrated in the institutional work of the EU. Hence, Ukraine’s reconstruction is considered as part of the enlargement process.
In conclusion, this brief assessment can show that the concept of strategic autonomy is a political agenda that guide certainly certain areas of the EU, especially in defence and security. In the latest development, it has been extended also in other areas, becoming part of the EU promoting itself as a EU global power. In this context of an EU in polycrises according to the definition coined by Edgar Morin in 1993, Ukraine’s position and role seem to be part of a larger programme where a geopolitical Union employ enlargement as one of its instrument within its new strategic autonomy.