“There will be a very serious wake-up call if Europe fails to provide for its security”.

 

“There will be a very serious wake-up call if Europe fails to provide for its security”.

Interview with Susan Stewart

27.11.2024

 

Dr. Susan Stewart is a political scientist currently serving as a Senior Fellow at the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP) in Berlin, where she specializes in Eastern Europe and Eurasia.

Her extensive academic and professional background includes notable positions at the Mannheim Centre for European Social Research and the University of Mannheim, where she contributed significantly to research and teaching on democratization and EU external relations.

At SWP, Dr. Stewart's research focuses on critical areas such as Ukrainian domestic and foreign policy, German-Russia relations, and the development of civil society in Eastern Europe.

Her expertise is widely recognized, making her a key voice in discussions about democracy and human rights in foreign policy. Through her numerous publications and research projects, Dr. Stewart has demonstrated an exceptional understanding of the political dynamics shaping Eastern Europe and Eurasia, solidifying her reputation as a leading expert in the field.

 

 

O. Kandyuk: Okay, so first of all thank you again for agreeing for this interview, thank you for your time and just to start with a general question - Нow do you assess Ukraine's prospects for EU accession in the context of the ongoing war?

 

S. Stewart: Well, number one, the war makes it harder to reform the country. So it slows down the pace of reform. This is evident from the challenges Ukraine faces, where the destruction caused by the conflict necessitates additional recovery measures that wouldn’t have been required otherwise.

Human capital that you need for reforms is also much reduced during the war. Within the war context it's become more difficult to do reforms and therefore to move in the direction of the EU, but I think it's still quite amazing how much Ukraine has nonetheless been able to do.

So that's not what I see as the major issues. Rather, the major issues are that we don't know what will happen in terms of the war and how this will all turn out and whether there will be any kind of sustainable peace situation. Without that it will be extremely difficult not only to progress on reforms but also to have a situation in which EU member states will consider admitting Ukraine.

Sometimes people refer to the situation in Cyprus but the situation in Cyprus has been more or less stable for years. The attempt to resolve that conflict and have all of Cyprus join the EU didn't work, but Cyprus is still in the EU. But I think this is not the situation with Ukraine. I mean, it's a much less stable type of situation and it's likely to remain so even if there were some kind of cessation of hostilities. So I do see that as a major problem.

Moreover, the EU decided to give Ukraine candidate status mainly because of the wartime situation. I mean it didn't decide that before and Ukraine decided to apply during wartime and I think that the decision on candidate status was made partially or largely on the grounds of the need to show solidarity with Ukraine and give it this perspective because of the way it's been treated by Russia and because it is valiantly defending itself and European values. But that doesn't mean that that more emotionally based decision is going to be able to be upheld over the course of the years that will be necessary to achieve these reforms. And the EU will be in a completely different place when that moment arrives and Ukraine can fulfil all the necessary steps.

So there are a lot of different levels on which the war has really had a huge impact on the question of whether Ukraine is going to be able to join the EU, even though the war essentially has acted as a catalyst for the relationship between the EU and Ukraine. Since like I just said it motivated Ukraine to apply, to become a candidate country and it motivated the EU to give Ukraine that status. So that is something that the war has actually achieved in a positive sense in terms of Ukraine's path to the EU.

 

O. Kandyuk: So in that case, if you think that integration of Ukraine is not possible in short term perspective how it would be possible for Ukraine to preserve existing motivation for future reforms and development?

 

S. Stewart: There's a reason that a lot of people think that it's going to happen quickly and that's in part because some Ukrainian high level politicians have stated that that will be the case and I think that that was an irresponsible type of statement to make. But it was made and so people believed it. I think maybe there have been some correctives introduced into the discourse now but of course those statements still stick around.

A sort of easy or maybe standard answer is that these reforms are supposed to be for Ukraine's benefit. It's not just to get into the EU but it's because Ukraine wants to reform and become a different country than it is now. So theoretically there should be this intrinsic motivation to reform. I think that what we've seen shows that the reforms occur (and this is still or now again the case) when we have this kind of “sandwich” situation. The external actors, the EU on one side - not only the EU but also the IMF and all who are coming up with conditionalities to support Ukraine - and Ukrainian civil society on the other hand kind of squeezing the elite in the middle until they take the next necessary reform steps.

I believe there is some level of interest among the elites. Some individuals are genuinely motivated to pursue meaningful reforms to advance the country. Others, however, appear to engage with the reform process more as a way to gain political capital, using it to demonstrate their support for Ukraine's EU aspirations and to showcase their efforts in driving the country closer to membership.

My concern is that essentially the EU will be in no rush to take on new members because obviously not all member states support that. Even if all might have voted unanimously for candidate status of Ukraine and Moldova and then Georgia, but nonetheless there's still a lot of uncertainty.

There is considerable debate among EU member states, both at the elite and societal levels, about whether Ukraine’s accession should proceed. This is largely beyond Ukraine’s control. At the same time, the EU faces the need for significant internal reforms, a process that will likely take years. This prolonged timeline on the EU's side risks diminishing Ukraine’s motivation over time, as delays could lead to frustration and disillusionment.

I think that the main problem is that Ukraine needs a substantively different form of governance to genuinely fulfil the Copenhagen criteria and reform to enter the EU. Currently, Ukraine is assessed through various reform areas and chapters of the acquis. In each area, there is a screening process to determine what Ukraine has already accepted in terms of rules and regulations, what it has not, what it needs to transpose into its own legislation, and what it must implement. This process is broken down into smaller reform steps.

However, I am not sure whether these small steps in any given sector will lead to a tipping point for a qualitative transformation in governance. It may require a more holistic approach beyond just the sum of these steps. The challenge lies in the fact that Ukraine has historically functioned under an oligarchic governance model, and there are many vested interests that would like this to continue. A significant portion of the population still has this model in their heads.

To achieve the necessary changes and strengthen motivation, there must be substantial shifts within the elite. While some individuals in the elite genuinely support reforms, they currently lack the critical mass needed to effect sufficient change. Therefore, a significant transformation within the elite is essential to foster genuine motivation for achieving necessary reforms.

 

O. Kandyuk: Speaking about the oligarchy. In one of your recent works you mentioned that the war has weakened the power of oligarchs in Ukraine in many respects. And I totally agree on that but from my point of view despite all that negative effect, Ukrainian democratic oligarchy or oligarchic democracy was effectively preventing appearance of dictatorship. So don’t you think that obvious weakening of oligarchy could lead to possible autocracy especially keeping in mind strong concentration of power during the war? Do you see the ways to avoid it?

 

S. Stewart: Well, there are such tendencies and it is possible. Although, the oligarchic governance model remains deeply ingrained in the minds of those currently in power and those who may come to power. There are many individuals interested in maintaining their roles as oligarchs, and I think it's not so unlikely that this model will reimpose itself.

One safeguard against authoritarianism is the Ukrainian population, and active citizen engagement. Despite exhaustion and trauma from the war, and maybe even because of that, I believe that people will resist allowing the country to devolve into any form of authoritarian rule. We have witnessed various revolutions protesting against corrupt governments and election fraud, demonstrating a persistent determination among citizens. The experiences gained from organizing protests and effective division of labor can be applied if there is concern about a shift toward autocracy. I am confident that there would be enormous pushback from the population, potentially preventing such changes.

 

O. Kandyuk: Speaking in terms of security, how do you think the current war in Ukraine is changing the European security architecture? What does this mean for NATO and the European Union? And also in context of Trumps victory do you foresee any shift in the EU’s approach toward military autonomy or the creation of a stronger EU defense forces maybe separate from NATO?

 

S. Stewart: In terms of the EU as a whole, there will be absolutely no major changes. While we see some developments—such as appointing as Commissioner for Defence and Space Andrius Kubilius, and Kaja Kallas taking on the role of the High Representative —the EU has historically not demonstrated itself to be a strong actor in foreign and security policy. This situation is unlikely to change soon due to a lack of unity on most foreign policy issues within the EU.

The role of the High Representative remains limited, with security and defence questions primarily managed at the national level. Although it is impressive that the EU has maintained unity regarding Ukraine thus far, I believe we may have reached a peak in this regard.

It depends on developments, but we see now that the EU has not managed to deal with its problems in terms of countries not adhering to its values, especially in the sphere of rule of law. The rise of extremist positions in several EU countries (including Germany) poses serious challenges for its future ability to act cohesively on foreign policy matters. I hope for a coalition of willing states—potentially including non-EU members—that can effectively support Ukraine and deter Russia militarily.

A lot of hope is placed on Poland and it does seem that Donald Tusk is starting to become active in terms of at least holding a series of meetings with various other leaders from countries who seem to be very clear on wanting to continue to support Ukraine and also very clear in terms of the need to deter Russia. Poland, the Baltic states, the Scandinavian countries - and the UK I would say is definitely an important candidate in that group.

If this coalition can leverage its resources effectively—perhaps even involving countries like Japan, Canada or South Korea—it could become a new center for promoting support for Ukraine and strengthening European security.

Germany - after the elections in February - could also be interested in joining such a coalition, and maybe it will begin to at least fulfil certain functions that are now missing in the European context.

 

O. Kandyuk: by the way, you consider Germany's policy towards Ukraine unsatisfactory, or at least that there is a huge room for improvement. But in light of the upcoming parliamentary elections and the growing likelihood of the CDU gaining an advantage, how do you think Germany's policy towards Ukraine will change? I mean what do you expecting from this new parliamentary coalition?

 

S. Stewart: Well, Germany's policy toward Ukraine has several positive aspects: it supported Ukraine's EU candidate status, which was uncertain at one point but ultimately happened. Germany has also engaged in reconstruction efforts for economic reasons but also out of genuine support for Ukraine.

I think there are certain kinds of key pillars of Germany's approach to Ukraine that are fine, but the main problem is that they're not flanked by anything close to a sufficient amount of support in the security and defence sectors.

There is insufficient support in terms of security and defence compared to what Germany should provide given its size and influence within Europe. While Germany claims to be the second-largest supporter after the US in absolute terms, this perspective does not account for GDP percentages compared to other countries supporting Ukraine.

Germany should have provided more substantial support for Ukraine's security needs while embedding this support within a broader discourse about European security and Germany's role therein. Despite the Zeitenwende speech and some other positive speeches from Olaf Scholz since February 2022 and promises of increased military funding, there has been no fundamental shift in mindset among much of Germany's elite or society.

The elite have conveyed messages suggesting that while Russia's aggression against Ukraine is regrettable, it remains containable and does not pose an immediate threat to Germany itself. This perception neglects the reality that Russia poses significant risks not only to Ukraine but also to Europe as a whole.

I think it's extremely important to say that Russia is a huge threat not only to Ukraine but also to Europe and to Germany specifically. We have neglected our security for decades and now we have to beef it up much more than just this initial hundred billion euro (the special allocation, or “Sondervermögen”). That means that other things will not be funded to the extent that they've been funded before, or there will be new taxes, or Germany will take on debt - which so far it has refused to do.

It is crucial for political leaders to communicate that neglecting security has consequences. The political elite must prepare citizens for these changes rather than allowing them to remain comfortable with their current lifestyles.

Because I think that later on - and maybe not so much later - there will be a very serious wake-up call if Europe fails to provide for its security.

 

O. Kandyuk: Many experts argue that, despite all the European support for Ukraine, this is still not a European war in the sense that it does not pose a direct military threat to EU member states. How do you assess the potential risks of 'war fatigue' in the EU, and what strategies should be employed to ensure sustained support for Ukraine from European countries?

 

S. Stewart: I think it's tied together. Russia does pose a threat to EU member states, and this is felt strongly in many of those countries, particularly in the Baltics, Poland, and Finland—especially those that share a border with Russia. To convince people of the necessity to support Ukraine, it is essential to emphasize that the current support stems from an emotional response to Ukraine's brutal and unprovoked attack. The fact that Ukrainians did not just accept this aggression but stood up and fought back is significant.

However, it is crucial to broaden the narrative. People need to understand that other European countries are also under threat, and this threat is concrete and likely to increase due to Vladimir Putin's regime. The military capacity of Russia, along with its determination to continue the war, has become a fundamental component of the ruling regime. Therefore, this growing threat must be addressed quickly.

Ukraine stands as a barrier between this threat and the rest of Europe. By helping Ukraine, we are ultimately helping ourselves by containing and pushing back against this threat before it reaches our borders. There needs to be a broader understanding of the nature of the Russian regime and Vladimir Putin specifically. Many people find it difficult to process the malign nature of this regime and therefore they find it hard to believe that a compromise with such a government is not possible. This understanding is challenging for both elites and society.

While I believe that German media have done a pretty good job conveying these messages, it remains difficult for people to grasp the full scope of the situation just by reading articles. Additionally, there is a good number of people in Germany who have already chosen to believe something else and do not trust mainstream media, often turning to sources that spread Russian disinformation.

 

O. Kandyuk: Many experts, including those I interviewed, also believe that the primary and most urgent need is not the acceleration of Ukraine's European integration, but the provision of security guarantees. However, when it comes to specific formats for these guarantees (given the obvious lack of prospects for NATO membership), their ideas seem rather vague. What is your opinion on this matter?

 

S. Stewart: Well, I am reluctant to say this, but I am not sure that Europe can provide security guarantees for Ukraine. If we have a coalition of willing countries ready to send troops to Ukraine, this could be part of increasing Ukraine's security. However, I don't know if this constitutes a guarantee; it is merely one component.

We have seen many bilateral security agreements between EU member states and Ukraine that are positive, but they are not very concrete. There are no budgets beyond 2024 or 2025 at the latest. People believe that their own security comes first. Thus, it is essential to establish a nexus between Ukraine's security and our own security.

Convincing people that there need to be boots on the ground from Europe in Ukraine is not easy. I am not a military expert, but I think some countries are hesitant to send certain resources because they feel they have reduced their own capacities and need what they have for their protection or are waiting for previously ordered equipment before releasing anything else.

I am just not sure that the military capacity exists within Europe to compensate for what the U.S. has been providing. Therefore, I don't see a viable path toward arming Ukraine significantly coming from Europe. Beyond certain potential components, I am not optimistic about hard and fast security guarantees being available for Ukraine.

 

O. Kandyuk: Yes, unfortunately. In the context of European security, after the war in Ukraine, do you believe that EU at last has a coherent and unified strategy toward Russia, and if so how long it will last? Will it be sustainable?

S. Stewart: On the EU level, if there’s some form of Russia strategy, it will likely be weak. Previous Russia strategies have been underwhelming, and without changes to the unanimity rule for passing such documents—which seems unlikely—there will always be a country, like Hungary, pushing back to maintain cooperation with Russia. This would effectively veto any firm approach within that strategy. So I don't think it would happen on the EU level, or if it did, it would be rather weak and not very robust.

Alternatively, individual countries could develop their own strategies. The EU seems to be moving in some domains towards greater influence of member states and less centralized control at the Brussels level. This might lead to coalitions of willing states aligning their strategies and acting collectively. However, a unified EU response seems improbable under the current circumstances.

 

O. Kandyuk: What would be the potential consequences for the region if Ukraine is unable to succeed in its fight for independence and territorial integrity? How could the failure of Ukraine’s struggle affect the security and stability of the region?

 

S. Stewart: If Ukraine fails, yes, of course, there'll be major consequences. Because Russia will be emboldened and will push forward, depending also on what Donald Trump now does and says with regard to NATO. NATO may be seriously weakened, in which case Putin will be emboldened more quickly. And, of course, with all the military production now going on in Russia, he is militarizing much faster than the rest of us here in Europe.

I think it won't take long until there's a serious challenge to NATO, maybe in the Baltics. And then if there's not a serious and convincing response, he will go further. At the same time, if populist and far-right forces gain ground in Europe, political resistance to Russia could weaken, allowing its influence to grow while the EU’s diminishes. Our security, as we have known it for the past two or three decades, will be totally called into question and basically will disappear.

We will be in danger of military attack by Russia, of further hybrid strategies and of increasing authoritarianism. It will be a different world than the one that we're used to living in.

 

O. Kandyuk: So the last question - in your view, what are the key risks to Ukraine's EU accession process, and how can they be mitigated in the context of ongoing conflict? I mean, if you were asked to outline possible scenarios for Ukraine's integration into the EU, which 2-3 options would you describe?

 

S. Stewart: Well, there's the nice scenario, right, where Ukraine continues to reform at a decent pace. And then the EU also manages either to reform itself or to decide that actually it can take on Ukraine and other countries without reforming. And so there's somehow, for whatever reasons, enough momentum to have people agree to that.

But that's a rather unlikely scenario. Then there's the scenario of Ukraine going part of the way and maybe moving through some of these stages like integrating into the internal market, etc. It would be a huge stage to achieve.

Ukraine will move along the process, but at some point it will slow down and get stuck. Either because Ukraine isn't willing to take the next reform steps or because the EU isn't ready for that, either because of certain member states or because it's not willing to reform itself internally and claims that this is necessary to go further, or it decides that it wants a different model.

Alternatively, geopolitical shifts—such as a renewed focus on relations with Russia—could deprioritize Ukraine’s accession, relegating it to a peripheral status. Over time, both sides might lose interest and then end up with something like the Turkey model, where technically Ukraine is still a candidate state, but actually neither side is really pursuing the process. I think those are some potential scenarios.

Of course, there’s still the possibility of an even more extreme scenario: the EU fails to continue to exist. So there's no EU integration after all. We should not rule that out completely.