Ukraine could get onto an impressive and sustained macroeconomic catch-up path
"With the clarity of full single market membership Ukraine could get onto an impressive and sustained macroeconomic catch-up path"
Blitz Interview with Michael Emerson
Michael Emerson is an Associate Senior Research Fellow at the Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS) in Brussels. He began his career at the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) in Paris from 1966 to 1973. Following the United Kingdom's accession to the European Union in 1973, Emerson joined the European Commission's Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs. There, he held various roles, including responsibilities for macroeconomic analysis, forecasting, and contributing to the development of the internal market and monetary union. Notably, he served as the European Commission's first Ambassador to the USSR and subsequently to Russia from 1991 to 1995.
After his tenure at the European Commission, Emerson was a Senior Research Fellow at the London School of Economics from 1996 to 1998. He then joined CEPS in 1998, where he has been instrumental in projects focusing on the European neighbourhood. His work has addressed conflict zones in regions such as the Balkans, Cyprus, the Middle East, and the Caucasus. More recently, his research has concentrated on Eastern European countries, particularly Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia. Emerson has also been actively involved in analyses related to Brexit.
Emerson's academic background includes a Master of Arts in Philosophy, Politics, and Economics from Balliol College, University of Oxford. He has been honored with honorary doctorates from the Universities of Keele and Kent. Throughout his career, Emerson has authored numerous publications, contributing significantly to the discourse on European integration, foreign policy, and economic affairs.
I. EU Enlargement and Institutional Reform
O. Kandyuk: Considering that we are facing a new potential wave of EU enlargement, how do you assess the impact of the most recent enlargements on the political dynamics and institutional effectiveness of the Union?
M. Emerson: The ‘Hungarian problem’ bites deeply. If Hungary has turned autocratic and a Putin-lover after 20 years of membership, what can be expected from any of the nine candidates now? Georgia already?
O. Kandyuk: In your works you discuss the need to reform the EU’s enlargement mechanisms. How realistic do you think such reforms are in the current geopolitical climate? What specific changes, in your opinion, are necessary for the successful integration of Ukraine and other candidate countries?
M. Emerson: Institutional reform, notably to curtail veto powers, are not feasible as of now, although the need for it is generally acknowledged. In this situation ‘gradual integration’ is the name of the game.
O. Kandyuk: Ukraine as a Catalyst for EU Reform: Could Ukraine's potential accession act as a catalyst for deeper institutional reforms within the EU, particularly in areas like decision-making and governance?
M. Emerson: The pressures are already there. No big movement to be expected beyond the "gradual integration").
II. Geopolitical Implications and Global Role of the EU
O. Kandyuk: How could Ukraine’s integration affect the EU’s role as a global geopolitical player, especially in its relations with the United States, Russia, and China?
M. Emerson: The combination of Trump and the ongoing war already see a big change under the heading "Rearmament", and recognition that the EU has to build up its strategic/military autonomy. This will take years to mature, but in thee meantime we see the Starmer/Macron initiative to assemble a coalition of the willing in support of a peace in Ukraine, but details are not publicly known.
O. Kandyuk: In the light of Donald Trump’s presidency how should the EU adapt its strategy to strengthen its geopolitical role and achieve greater strategic autonomy? In light of the ongoing war in Ukraine, rising tensions with China, and potential shifts in US support for Europe, what concrete steps can the EU take to ensure it remains a cohesive and effective global actor while safeguarding its integration goals and transatlantic ties?
M. Emerson: As above, rearm and get organised militarily, for example by taking over NATO assets for use of Europe+Canada.
III. Democracy, Security, and Political Stability
O. Kandyuk: In your paper "Strengthening Europe's Democratic Identity and Security in a More Autocratic World", you emphasize the need to reinforce the EU’s democratic identity. What concrete steps should EU institutions take to counter the growing influence of authoritarian regimes?
M. Emerson: ‘Concrete steps’ not the right expression. Rather it is a matter of the Trump making Europeans more aware of the democratic values they mostly share.
IV. Economic Development and Integration
O. Kandyuk: In your joint work with Daniel Gros, you analyze the economic development of EU neighboring countries. What lessons from this analysis could be applied to Ukraine in its pursuit of EU integration?
M. Emerson: The clear lesson is that with the clarity of full single market membership Ukraine could get onto an impressive and sustained macroeconomic catch-up path.
O. Kandyuk: You have mentioned that while the economic development of new EU members after past enlargements has been successful, political challenges have emerged. What lessons from previous enlargement rounds could be applied to Ukraine’s potential accession?
M. Emerson: With a view to both Ukraine and the Western Balkans there is the need to insure against the ‘Hungary-type problem’. One cannot assume democratic stability, but expect at least temporary relapses into authoritarianism; Poland reverted back into democracy. Hungary may do the same at their next elections.
V. Internal Political Dynamics and Membership Prospects
O. Kandyuk: Considering the influence of internal political shifts within EU member states on enlargement policy, how might current political trends within the EU impact Ukraine’s membership prospects?
M. Emerson: There will be years in any case for Ukraine to get closer to the conditions for membership, both for reasons attached to the ongoing war and normal work to become compliant with EU laws and regulations.
O. Kandyuk: How do you assess the differences between the Eastern enlargement processes of the 2000s and today’s prospects for Ukraine?
M. Emerson: It’s clear: the 2004 enlargements did not anticipate the problems of democratic back-sliding that have emerged. Today there are no illusions.
VI. Future of EU-Ukraine Relations and Long-Term Scenarios
O. Kandyuk: In your paper "Scenarios for a Wider Europe", you explored different scenarios for EU enlargement. How has your perspective on these scenarios evolved since 2019? Which three or four basic scenarios for EU-Ukraine relations seem most realistic in the current geopolitical context?
M. Emerson: Interesting. I had forgotten about this paper. Looking at it again I see these scenarios:
i/ Upgrade the AA/DCFTAs (Association Agreement/Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Areas) under the heading AA+. This is what is happening, but more strongly with the explicit membership-candidate dimension that I did not anticipate (I did not anticipate Putin’s 2022 invasion)
ii/ Develop a Wider Europe policy. This also emerges in a very light form with the European Political Community initiated by Macron.
iii/ Advance a multi-speed Europe. This also is happening, notably with the defence initiatives currently under preparation for a Coalition of the Willing.
So overall these scenarios are not only still looking relevant, but have been advancing in practice.