While staged accession is possible, Ukraine’s integration cannot remain incomplete indefinitely

“While staged accession is possible, Ukraine’s integration cannot remain incomplete indefinitely due to security concerns requiring full economic and military coordination.”

Interview with Veronica Anghel

Dr. Veronica Anghel is a prominent political expert specializing in European politics, democratization, and institutional development. As a researcher at the European University Institute, she focuses on political transitions, governance challenges, and the resilience of democratic institutions. Her work provides valuable insights into how formal and informal political structures interact, shaping the stability of European democracies.

Her research covers key issues such as EU enlargement, democratic backsliding, and political crises in Central and Eastern Europe. She has contributed to understanding how political elites influence institutional reforms and how external pressures, such as geopolitical shifts or economic instability, impact governance.

Beyond academia, Dr. Anghel actively engages in policy advising and public discourse, providing expert analysis on European integration, rule of law, and institutional reform. Her expertise is widely recognized for its depth and relevance, making her a key voice in understanding the evolving political landscape of Europe.

O. Kandyuk: Let’s start with the EU's strategic autonomy: While it is clear now that there is no alternative path, can the EU truly achieve autonomy given the fragmentation of national interests, and how realistic is this goal in the short term?

V. Anghel: The EU’s pursuit of strategic autonomy is complicated by deep-seated national divisions and institutional inertia, making full autonomy an unlikely short-term goal. While the Russia-Ukraine war has accelerated EU-wide coordination on enlargement and security, it has not eliminated fundamental disagreements between member states on defense, energy, and foreign policy priorities.

Important obstacles in achieving strategic autonomy include: diverging national interests, where some member states (e.g., France) prioritize defense autonomy, while others (e.g., Eastern Europe, Nordic states) still see NATO as their primary security pillar. Then there are decision-making constraints; unanimity in key areas of foreign and security policy prevents rapid action and keeping foreign policy decision making at state level will lead to inefficiencies in coordinating defense spending and strategy building. There are economic and institutional limitations, expanding the EU’s financial and military capabilities requires massive institutional reforms, which are politically contentious and unlikely to be resolved quickly. Thus, while the EU will likely continue efforts to strengthen its strategic autonomy, true independence from external actors (e.g., the U.S. security umbrella, global energy markets) is only feasible in the long term.

O. Kandyuk: How do you assess the likelihood of the EU adopting a "multi-tier membership" concept, where countries remain within a unified legal framework but with varying degrees of political integration?

V. Anghel: The likelihood of a multi-tier membership model is high; this as an emerging alternative to full accession. Given the EU’s institutional stagnation and growing enlargement fatigue, a differentiated approach—where some countries integrate faster than others—may be the only politically viable path forward. Overall, the multi-tier model is likely to emerge as the default approach, particularly if full institutional reform remains politically unfeasible. However, the EU will need to clearly define the benefits and limitations of partial membership to prevent disillusionment among candidate countries.

O. Kandyuk: If the EU adapts to Ukraine's accession, this will probably alter its internal structure. What political compromise is more likely: reforming voting procedures, revising unanimity principles, or reducing integration pressure on new member states?

V. Anghel: The most likely compromise is a partial reform of voting procedures, particularly in areas related to enlargement, foreign policy, and economic governance. The EU is struggling to balance enlargement with internal functionality, and Ukraine’s accession will further strain an already slow decision-making process. However, fully abolishing unanimity remains politically controversial, as several member states, such as Hungary and Poland, fear losing their veto power. Politically viable reforms include expanding qualified majority voting (QMV) in select areas like foreign policy, sanctions, and budget allocations; creating "enhanced cooperation" mechanisms that allow a subset of member states to advance certain policies without requiring full EU-wide agreement; and introducing a weighted voting system that grants larger economies more influence while maintaining protections for smaller states. Less likely reforms include eliminating unanimity entirely, as too many member states rely on the veto as a tool of leverage, and reducing integration pressure on new members, since while staged accession is possible, Ukraine’s integration cannot remain incomplete indefinitely due to security concerns requiring full economic and military coordination. Given these constraints, the EU will likely pursue incremental voting reforms, limiting veto power in certain domains while preserving consensus in politically sensitive areas such as taxation and constitutional changes.

O. Kandyuk: What is the probability that the EU will have to revert to a "multi-speed Europe" configuration due to pressures from both new and existing member states?

V. Anghel: The probability of a multi-speed Europe is very high, as institutional congestion, conflicting national interests, and geopolitical urgency present major barriers to uniform integration. The EU has already struggled to function efficiently with 27 members, and adding Ukraine, Moldova, and the Western Balkans will only make consensus-based governance more difficult. Security-driven urgency may require the EU to accelerate economic and security integration for Ukraine while postponing full political membership, creating a two-speed model where core EU members deepen integration while newer members lag behind. Differentiated integration is not new, as the EU already operates with varying levels of participation in the Eurozone, Schengen, and other policy areas.

To be clear, a multi-speed Europe is not a good solution for the future of European integration and coordination, but it is the more likely ‘halfway house’ solution that the EU signals it is currently ready to enact.

O. Kandyuk: You have studied how crises influence EU integration processes. Can it be said that wars and external threats are stronger unifying factors than internal institutional evolution?

V. Anghel: Wars and external threats can serve as powerful unifying forces for the European Union, but their ability to drive lasting integration is often reactive and inconsistent, depending on how national interests align in response to the crisis. The pandemic and the Russia-Ukraine war demonstrate different types of crisis-driven EU responses. The pandemic increased cross-national solidarity and institutional adaptation, leading to initiatives such as Next Generation EU. In contrast, the war in Ukraine has reinforced national decision-making and highlighted the limits of EU unity, as solidarity with Ukraine does not necessarily translate into greater cohesion among member states. While external threats can accelerate integration in certain areas, such as defense coordination or energy policy, they do not automatically resolve long-term institutional weaknesses, such as decision-making inefficiencies or economic disparities among members. External threats force short-term unity, but they do not necessarily deepen integration in a structural or sustainable manner. 

O. Kandyuk: In your article "Is Europe really forged through crisis?" you analyze the impact of crises on EU integration. Do you consider this process sustainable, or does it create new fault lines within the Union?

V. Anghel: The idea that Europe is forged through crisis suggests that integration advances when external shocks force the EU to adapt. However, this process is not always sustainable, as it often creates new divisions rather than resolving underlying tensions. The response to the pandemic strengthened economic integration but left governance concerns, such as rule of law violations in some member states, unresolved. Similarly, the war in Ukraine has led to renewed enthusiasm for enlargement, but without the necessary institutional reforms, this could exacerbate existing fault lines between old and new members. Enlargement without adaptation risks overloading EU institutions and deepening frustration among candidate countries if promises of membership are not met with practical steps. The EU’s crisis-driven integration model relies on reactive rather than proactive governance, which can work in the short term but risks making the Union more fragile over time. If crises continue to be the primary catalyst for reform, the EU may struggle to maintain long-term stability without deeper structural changes.

O. Kandyuk: You have studied mechanisms of EU legitimacy. Can deepening European democracy (e.g., expanding European Parliament powers) compensate for the democratic legitimacy deficit, or is this crisis more fundamental in nature?

V. Anghel: Expanding the powers of the European Parliament could help address the EU’s democratic legitimacy deficit, but it would not resolve the deeper structural and political challenges that fuel this crisis. The European Union’s legitimacy problem is not simply about institutional design; it also stems from a growing disconnect between EU institutions and national publics, as well as the perception that decision-making is dominated by elite bureaucracies rather than direct democratic representation. While giving the European Parliament more power could strengthen accountability at the supranational level, it does not address the core issue that most EU citizens still identify primarily with their national governments. Additionally, national leaders often shift blame to Brussels for unpopular policies, reinforcing the perception of an unaccountable European elite. Without stronger mechanisms for engaging national electorates in EU decision-making and improving transparency in policymaking, institutional reforms alone are unlikely to resolve the legitimacy deficit in a meaningful way.

O. Kandyuk: In your article "What went wrong in Hungary", you analyze democratic backsliding. How do you evaluate the EU's role in preventing such processes? Should the EU employ stricter mechanisms against member states?

V. Anghel: The EU’s role in preventing democratic backsliding has been inconsistent, and its current mechanisms have proven insufficient to reverse entrenched autocratization in member states such as Hungary. The EU has tools to address rule-of-law violations, including Article 7 proceedings and conditionality mechanisms tied to EU funding, but these have been applied hesitantly and often too late to be effective. Hungary’s case demonstrates that once an autocratic government secures control over institutions, legal changes can be used to entrench its power while formally remaining within EU rules. This suggests that the EU should adopt stricter pre-accession criteria for democracy, ensuring that candidate countries have not just the legal framework for democratic governance but also deeper societal and institutional resilience against authoritarian tendencies. Post-accession, the EU should develop more robust enforcement mechanisms that go beyond financial penalties, including stronger political consequences for persistent rule-of-law violations. However, this approach faces political resistance from member states that fear similar scrutiny or prefer to avoid setting a precedent for intervention. The EU must strike a balance between safeguarding democracy and avoiding perceptions of overreach, but its current reluctance to take decisive action has weakened its credibility on democratic governance.

O. Kandyuk: In "Failing forward in Eastern Enlargement", you describe a "failing forward" approach in Eastern enlargement. How does this affect the Union's long-term legitimacy among new members?

V. Anghel: The “failing forward” approach in Eastern enlargement has led to an expansion of the EU without fully resolving institutional and political challenges, primarily in the EU as well as in member states, creating long-term legitimacy concerns among all member states. Enlargement has often proceeded despite unresolved governance issues, with the assumption that integration itself would drive further democratic consolidation. This strategy succeeded in some cases but failed in others, as seen in Hungary’s backsliding and persistent rule-of-law concerns in other states. The failure to enforce democratic standards consistently has contributed to disillusionment in newer member states, where EU membership was expected to bring stronger democratic norms but instead has sometimes coincided with political stagnation or regression. The risk is that future enlargements will follow the same pattern, where geopolitical necessity pushes the EU to integrate new members before either the EU or new members are ready, leading to new internal divisions. If the EU does not strengthen its approach to democratic conditionality and enforcement, it risks diminishing its own legitimacy as a union built on shared values.

O. Kandyuk: You have written about the transatlantic interaction crisis in previous years. Now it is understood that this crisis was not temporary and that the war in Ukraine merely delayed an inevitable divergence between EU and US interests. But will this divergence be permanent? Is this truly the end of transatlantic partnership as we knew it?

V. Anghel: The divergence between EU and US interests is not a temporary shift but a structural transformation that was delayed rather than reversed by the war in Ukraine. The initial transatlantic unity in response to Russia’s invasion masked long-standing disagreements over security, economic policy, and the broader role of the West in global affairs. The United States has become more inward-focused, with growing political divisions limiting its ability to maintain a consistent foreign policy toward Europe. At the same time, Europe has learned from the instability of the Trump years and has begun actively pursuing strategic autonomy, preparing for a future where it cannot rely on unconditional American support. The second Trump administration has only accelerated this process, with its rhetoric undermining NATO’s foundational principles and its policies challenging the EU’s economic and political stability. However, while the transatlantic partnership as it once existed—based on shared long-term strategic goals and institutionalized cooperation—may not return, complete divergence is unlikely. The US and EU still have overlapping security interests, particularly in deterring Russian aggression, and they remain economically interdependent. What is emerging is a new kind of transatlantic relationship: one that is more transactional, less predictable, and shaped by shifting domestic political landscapes on both sides. This means that cooperation will continue in key areas, but without the ideological and institutional coherence that defined the Cold War and post-Cold War eras.

O. Kandyuk: The last question, I usually ask is about scenarios. What 3-4 options of EU-Ukraine relations you can see as possible in short-middle time perspective?

V. Anghel: In the short to mid-term, there are three or four likely scenarios for EU-Ukraine relations.

The first is a phased integration model, where Ukraine gains access to specific EU structures—such as the single market and security cooperation mechanisms—without full political membership. This model would allow Ukraine to benefit economically and strategically while giving the EU time to adapt its institutions before full accession.

The second scenario is a rapid but conditional accession, where Ukraine is granted membership in an accelerated process, but with strict oversight and transitional safeguards to ensure compliance with EU governance standards. This would be a high-risk strategy, potentially leading to governance challenges within the EU if Ukraine’s institutional reforms remain incomplete.

The third scenario is an extended waiting period, where Ukraine remains a candidate for years while the EU hesitates to fully integrate it due to economic or political concerns. This would mirror the Western Balkans experience, potentially causing frustration and weakening the EU’s credibility in the region.

A fourth possibility is an alternative integration framework, such as a European Political Community or a new regional partnership that stops short of full EU membership but formalizes Ukraine’s alignment with the EU in a more structured way.

Each scenario presents trade-offs, and the final outcome will likely depend on how quickly the EU can adapt its own structures to manage enlargement while balancing geopolitical and internal stability concerns.