In the end we may end up in a situation where Europe may want integration more than Ukraine

“In the end we may end up in a situation where Europe may want integration more than Ukraine”

Interview with Anastasiya Shapochkina

 

Anastasiya Shapochkina is Founder and President of Eastern Circles, a leading French think tank dedicated to the geoeconomics of energy and defence in Eastern Europe, with a particular focus on Ukraine and Russia. Her research explores the intersection of strategic policy, energy security, and economic governance in the post-Soviet space, examining how regional and global actors navigate complex security and economic challenges.

She has over a decade of experience advising industry and governments on market analysis, technological assessment, and cross-sectoral research in renewable energy, nuclear power, utilities, and e-mobility. Since 2012, she has served as a lecturer in geopolitics at Sciences Po Paris, where she teaches on the role of business in EU–Russia relations, European energy policy, and defence strategy.

Shapochkina holds a master’s degree from the Georgetown University School of Foreign Service, German and European Studies Program, and is a recognized voice in policy debates, contributing insights on European strategic autonomy, defence innovation, and the geoeconomics of post-Soviet states.

 

O. Kandyuk: What do you see as the key differences between the current debate on EU enlargement – Including Ukraine and several other candidate countries – and the discussions surrounding the integration of Central European states in the 1990s and early 2000s?

A. Shapochkina: Yes, there is a massive difference. The main difference concerns demand. The supply of candidates has remained relatively steady, but the demand has essentially been saturated. In other words, there is no longer strong demand for new members within the European Union.

Internally, the European Union has been deeply affected by the phobia of immigration, which emerged from the real migration crisis, especially since 2015. These fears have been actively used by extreme right parties, which in turn have been gaining power across the European Union. Ironically, this includes countries that joined during the enlargement wave you are referring to. Today we see Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary governed by parties of the extreme right.

At the same time, similar parties across Europe –from the Netherlands to Sweden to Italy – periodically gain electoral victories. They may appear in more moderate forms, but they remain firmly positioned on the right and strongly focused on immigration. Consequently, they oppose any new accession.

This makes new enlargement – whether for Moldova, Ukraine, Georgia or the Balkan countries – highly undesirable in the mind of the average citizen.

Another important factor is the transformation of the information environment. Numerous studies show that people read less conventional media today. Instead, they receive news through social media or through algorithmic feeds. The information space is increasingly saturated with artificially produced content and artificial intelligence-generated information. Such information may be true or false, but it reaches a far broader audience than traditional media.

As a result, the debate about accession is driven increasingly by domestic political dynamics – local elections and national elections. Only after these domestic considerations can the discussion move to the European level.

In expert discussions we also observe that the deadline, or the target date for enlargement, continues to be pushed further into the future. I think what we are likely to see is something resembling a “Turkey scenario”.

We are already seeing a Turkey-like scenario emerging for new accession countries. The reasons differ from country to country, but the outcome is similar.

When we think about Ukraine, this “Turkey scenario” seems to be playing out quite clearly. If we recall Turkey’s case, the lack of accession and repeated rejection by the European Union for different reasons eventually contributed to strengthening Turkey as a country, as a regional power and as a military power.

Ukraine has been heavily focused on accession negotiations, especially over the last fifteen years. But the country has moved from massive Euro-enthusiasm toward the beginnings of Euro-skepticism – very similar to the Turkish dynamic that developed earlier.

At the same time, the accession negotiations are taking place in the context of a full-scale war. They are also tied to increasing demands on the European Union to provide financial assistance and military assistance to Ukraine – In other words, to purchase American and European weapons and supply them to Ukraine.

This has been the main premise underlying the discussion of European accession since 2022. However, in my opinion, by 2026 we can already see that this assumption is beginning to shift.

Inside Ukraine there is a growing understanding that the only real security guarantee the country can rely on is its own military-industrial complex and its own capacity to produce weapons.

This dynamic has changed dramatically over the last four years because Ukraine’s capacity to produce its own weapons has increased significantly – just as Turkey’s defence industry expanded in the past, especially after the U.S. embargo on weapons exports.

Interestingly, we are observing very parallel developments today. These parallels are not intentional; they simply happen to resemble each other.

Turkey is not Albania, and Ukraine is not Albania either. Ukraine is not Moldova or Georgia. Of course, the number of people in Ukraine has declined dramatically. The population went from roughly 52 million in the 2002 to perhaps half that today – maybe around 27 million. However, the political psychology of the state remains increasingly centres on defence. The ability to guarantee one’s own security ultimately determines foreign policy priorities.

Once Ukraine becomes capable of guaranteeing its own defence through its own military-industrial capacity, it will not need any other security guarantees.

And Euroscepticism has already built up quite substantially inside the country to kind of support that position. And Ukraine is not necessarily going to have the same leverage when negotiating accession. So in the end of the day, that internet meme which was popular in the first months of the war – the one consisting basically of the phrase that Europe is looking for membership inside Ukraine – may actually come to the fore, I would say, especially because of the financial situation, which has shifted quite dramatically since the American decision to bomb Iran and the Iranian response.

And that development has increased – and more importantly, shifted – the situation surrounding European accession, at least in my view. At first sight, these may appear to be unrelated events. But within a week we have seen how related they actually are, because this has shifted the demand for Ukrainian weapons in the global market and has effectively moved Ukraine from a fringe actor – which was trying to prove to the world that it was not simply a kind of “garage band,” tinkering on the margins in a kitchen and assembling a four-rotor drone out of Chinese components – to a very different position.

Ukraine no longer has to prove that it has actually created a weapons ecosystem. And this ecosystem includes effective counter-drone capabilities—perhaps among the only truly effective counter-drone solutions currently available. It includes, but is not limited to, advanced command-and-control systems. And this in turn has been responsible for the development of a much broader system: essentially a whole interconnected technological and robotic ecosystem which integrates conventional weapons with new technologies.

And that ecosystem itself is evolving extremely rapidly, moving every couple of months to a new stage of development. It combines robotic platforms, combines radio-electronic warfare, combines artificial intelligence. But at the same time they have also figured out, through experience, the logistics chains, the training systems, and they have revised their military training and worked out the preparation systems for their soldiers.

So what we are seeing is a completely different ecosystem, which Ukraine is obviously now in a position to export. And for a long time it was essentially a credibility problem that stood in the way—the perception problem of Ukraine being something junior, something small, and somehow still associated with Russia, which continued to be perceived as the major and decisive actor.

And now finally the war in the Middle East has turned the tables. Within ten days we have seen at least three Ukrainian companies reaching valuations close to one billion dollars or even exceeding one billion. We have seen a massive influx of capital and new contracts –Ukrainians being first in line for new contracts with the U.S. Department of Defense. This is rather ironic, given that only about two months ago the United States issued a ban on drone imports.

So in this global context, when Middle Eastern leaders are calling the Ukrainian leadership asking for assistance, when Ukrainian companies are calling their counterparts in the Middle East proposing cooperation – and being very warmly welcomed – we are witnessing something quite significant. Because two weeks ago those markets were reserved primarily for American and European weapons. South Korean companies maybe had some presence there. Turkish companies potentially as well. But today this situation has changed.

It is a shift comparable in some ways to what happened after 2022, when Iran suddenly emerged as a major drone exporter. And that shift is changing Ukraine’s position on the global map today.

Hopefully Ukraine will be able to hold on to this position. Of course the markets are going to move, competitors will attempt to catch up. But hopefully Ukraine can retain that position.

Hopefully Ukrainian companies will prioritize the development of local brands and not simply act as subcontractors for larger international companies. I believe they have already learned this lesson from their own IT industry in the 1990s and early 2000s. Maintaining that position will of course be extremely difficult.

However, in the immediate context, although these developments may appear completely unrelated when one simply reads the news, to me they actually answer the broader question of European accession.

As Europe continues to prolong deadlines and move slowly, Ukraine continues integrating into the European military and defence ecosystem and also into global defence markets, gradually occupying more and more space there.

And for me the best form of integration will come on the day when Europeans wake up and realize that Ukraine has already been fully integrated into NATO processes, into NATO interoperability systems – which Ukraine has been integrating into since 2014 and in some respects even earlier. And that Ukraine has also become integrated into the military-industrial complex – In other words, into production systems. And at that point the entire question of accession begins to look different.

I think that in the end we may end up relatively soon in a situation where Europe may want integration more than Ukraine. And possibly also in a situation where integration in a formal sense is no longer strictly necessary, because it will have already taken place de facto.

It will have happened through the millions of Ukrainians who are now living in European countries, mastering the languages of those societies – sometimes even better than their own – and integrating into labour markets, schools and social systems. It will also have happened through trade integration, which has progressively removed trade barriers since 2014 and most importantly through defence cooperation and military-industrial integration.

O. Kandyuk: Do you think the European Union is actually interested in a “Turkey-like scenario” for Ukraine – that is, having a militarily strong state closely aligned with Europe but not fully integrated into the EU? Would such an arrangement be seen in Europe as a strategic asset or rather as a potential source of instability and a threat on the Union’s borders?

A. Shapochkina: Thinking about Ukraine as a threat today is realistic only in one scenario: if Russia fully invades Ukraine and occupies the majority—or even 100 percent—of its territory.

In that case, as we have already seen in the territories currently occupied by Russia, Moscow would integrate Ukrainian military resources and the Ukrainian military-industrial complex into its own structures and redirect them toward Russian objectives. Those objectives, as Putin has repeatedly stated since 2021, involve changing the European security architecture.

It is important to remember that Putin’s objectives have never really been about occupying Ukraine in the conventional sense. In his worldview, Ukraine is not an independent state at all. He already sees it as part of Russia—as a region, much like Belarus or like another territory of the Russian state.

In this perspective, Zelensky is not regarded by Putin as a legitimate state leader. He is treated more like an obstacle or nuisance.

If Russia were able to integrate Ukrainian military resources into its own armed forces and defence industry, then those capabilities—combined with Russia’s very consistent industrial, foreign, and defence policies—could indeed pose a real threat to Europe.

Outside of that scenario, however, I do not think Ukraine is seen as a threat in Europe.

Historically speaking, there has never been an instance of Ukraine conquering Europe, as far as I remember.

O. Kandyuk: In your work on EU strategic autonomy, you point to both institutional and mental barriers. Which of these appears more difficult to overcome today: disagreements among member states or a broader reluctance to assume strategic responsibility?

A. Shapochkina: At our think tank, Eastern Circles, we have written several pieces addressing the question of strategic autonomy.

One examined steel imports from Russia into the European Union. Another looked at China’s dominance across the drone value chain, which is directly relevant not only for drones but for many other types of weapons systems. We have also written about the integration of Ukraine into the European military-industrial complex and why this would be beneficial.

More recently, we produced a study for NATO’s Allied Command Transformation examining lessons learned from Ukraine and the technologies that are currently shaping modern warfare.

From the European perspective, strategic autonomy is constrained by several factors.

Only one of them is political, although it is a very significant one. For eighty years, the alliance between Europe and the United States has essentially functioned as a geopolitical and geoeconomic pact. Europe accepted the American security umbrella within NATO, and in exchange it became a major market for American weapons.

This arrangement has been undermined by the volatility of American foreign and defence policy under the Trump administration.

We can see this clearly in official statements – from the speech by JD Vance at the Munich Security Conference in 2025 to the American national security and defence strategy documents. These statements indicate that Europe has been relegated to a secondary position in American strategic priorities.

Russia, meanwhile, is no longer described in these documents as a primary adversary or military threat.

For Europe this is deeply troubling, because European strategic documents – from the French defence review to the European Union’s White Paper on defence and numerous NATO and national strategy documents – still identify Russia as the main military threat.

As a result, the strategic assumptions underlying European defence policy have been turned upside down.

The most dramatic example is Germany. For decades Germany pursued a defence policy centred on restraint and peace. Now the country has announced its ambition to become the largest defence power in Europe – a goal articulated by Chancellor Friedrich Merz.

And this is in total dissonance with each other. Europe has therefore realized that it can no longer rely on American supplies of weapons.

The capacity of American production at scale is now being tested in real time, as we speak, in the Middle East, where demand for American air defence systems has increased dramatically. At the same time, European demand has never declined, because Europe is now purchasing weapons from the United States for Ukraine. Since January 2025, the United States has stopped its own direct supplies of weapons as well as its own funding. As a result, the entire burden has shifted onto European shoulders, like the Ukrainians have been desperately searching for funds to purchase weapons and Europeans desperatelylooking for weapons.

And here the United States is likely to face serious limitations, because it has demonstrated that it cannot produce a sufficient quantity of conventional weapons over such short periods of time. It therefore cannot lead—and by “lead” I mean not simply participate in, provoke, or initiate conflicts—but actually conduct and sustain multiple large-scale wars on several fronts simultaneously, because of the limits of its industrial production capacity.

Once Europe understood this reality, it also realized that it would have to develop its own production capacity. And here we encounter a psychological barrier in countries such as Germany, the Netherlands, and several countries in Southern Europe, which still tend to hope that American political priorities may change with a change of administration.

First of all, a change of administration is no longer guaranteed. And second, even the predictability of elections themselves can no longer be taken entirely for granted.

We have already seen extensive gerrymandering efforts in preparation for the midterm elections. One can only imagine what might happen in preparation for the next presidential election. At this point, virtually every institution in the United States appears to be under the control of the executive branch, with the exception of the central bank, which is holding on for dear life and may do so only for a short time longer. Once Jerome Powell’s term expires, he can simply be replaced.

If that happens, it will effectively eliminate the last independent institution within the American system of government. And this naturally leads to a situation in which even the outcomes of elections become increasingly unpredictable. We have already seen Donald Trump’s complete disregard for both international and domestic law.

He ignores judicial rulings. He disregards institutional constraints. In practice, there appear to be very few limits on his power – something reminiscent, in a certain sense, of the type of authority once associated with Louis XIV in France.

Under such circumstances, America’s allies increasingly understand that they can no longer rely on Trump. At the same time, however, many of them continue to hope that at some point the administration may change. Yet even if we assume that it might eventually change, we must remember that Trump is not an entirely new phenomenon in American foreign policy. Rather, he represents a continuation.

He does not constitute a break with the broader trend; instead, he represents its logical continuation. That trend began under George W. Bush, continued under Obama, then under the first Trump administration, followed by Biden, and now under Trump again—this time in a more radical and accelerated form. But it remains essentially the same trend: the gradual—and now increasingly rapid—reduction of the American presence in Europe.

This has involved a reorientation away from Europe—previously toward Asia, and now we do not yet fully know what. What is clear, however, is that it is a movement away from Europe. This shift has manifested itself in many different ways: in the gradual reduction of the American military presence in Europe, the slow withdrawal and declining number of military personnel and weapons systems, but also in less visible areas.

For example, at many leading schools of international affairs in the United States, European studies programmes have gradually been replaced by Asian studies programmes. The number of experts specializing in Europe has declined significantly. Today, relatively few people in the United States are able to explain what Europe actually is, and even fewer seem to care about it.

This realization is slowly but steadily sinking in among European leaders. But at this point we encounter a second major obstacle to European strategic autonomy—namely, Europe’s own limitations.

First, there are industrial limitations. When we speak about defence autonomy, we must think not only about how much equipment we can produce per month or per year, and of what type, but also about how much of that equipment we actually produce ourselves—in other words, how much of the production process across the supply chain remains under our control.

And here the limits of that control become apparent very quickly. In our own study of Chinese dominance in the drone supply chain, we focused specifically on small drones, but we also examined several components that are essential for many other modern weapons systems.

One such example is batteries, which today are economically produced almost exclusively in China. Attempts to establish production in Europe—for example in Sweden last year—ended in bankruptcy less than a year after the project was launched, despite significant political support and financial backing from European institutions.

In many respects, Europe has simply arrived too late. If you want to catch up with a market in which you missed the opportunity ten years ago, you need to radically reconsider your political and industrial priorities.

Batteries, which are a crucial component of modern weapons systems, are today produced economically almost entirely in China. The economic rationale behind this dominance is overwhelming.

Despite numerous political declarations in Europe about the desire to capture part of this market, Chinese dominance is in fact being reinforced by Europe’s own green energy policies.

These policies are rational, innovative, and strategically attractive in times of peace—when China is not perceived as a military-strategic partner of Russia. But in wartime they take on a very different meaning. Today Russia has been recognised by almost every European leader as a direct military threat.

And batteries are only one example. If we look at magnets, which are an essential component of any motor—not only in small drones but also in tanks, ships, aircraft, and many other military systems—the situation becomes even clearer.

Approximately 98 percent of global magnet production is controlled by China.

Catching up with such dominance will be extremely difficult.

Some attempts are being made in Europe, of course, but this discussion inevitably leads us to the widely debated topic of rare earths and critical raw materials.

China does not necessarily control the raw resources themselves. These materials can be extracted in other parts of the world. The United States once dominated this sector and still has considerable potential. Europe also possesses some resources.

However, once again we encounter the problem of economic rationality and the cost of developing these industries. More importantly, China’s real advantage lies not only in resource extraction but in the processing and conversion technologies that transform raw materials into usable components for defence systems.

China has spent decades developing and refining these production and processing capabilities in order to meet the economic requirements of modern warfare.

Closing this gap will be as difficult as replicating advanced semiconductor manufacturing, which Taiwan currently dominates and which many countries are now trying to replicate.

The complexity of mastering the processing of rare earths and critical metals is comparable.

And these are two absolutely critical components of European defence autonomy.

Many other challenges—such as budgetary constraints or the question of where funding will come from—are, at least in principle, solvable.

Once bombs start falling on European territory, everyone will quickly understand that building new university facilities or hospital infrastructure is not the most urgent priority; instead, resources will need to be directed toward air defence systems.

In fact, I believe that this understanding already exists within many major energy companies across the European Union and globally. These are international corporations that operate in multiple markets and therefore anticipate similar challenges everywhere.

In that sense, this is not fundamentally a problem of money. Money ultimately reflects political priorities, and priorities can change.

The real problem is different. Even if Europe were to allocate unlimited financial resources to this task, the question would remain: how exactly do we catch up? Europe is decades behind in certain industrial processes. Catching up with such industrial capabilities is extremely difficult.

Finally, a third major obstacle to European defence autonomy—beyond the longstanding habit of relying on the United States and beyond the difficulty of replacing the roughly nine strategic capabilities that the United States currently provides—relates to the differing European perceptions of China.

In a global order that is rapidly shifting, the role of the United States has changed. It is no longer perceived automatically as Europe’s primary ally; instead, it has become an increasingly unpredictable actor that may pursue its own strategic alignments, sometimes independently of traditional alliances.

In these circumstances, some European leaders are beginning to search for a new “strategic patron.”

For some of them, China appears to be a possible option.

At the Munich Security Conference this year, the Canadian prime minister even suggested—paraphrasing Margaret Thatcher—that Canada might one day turn away from the United States and, if necessary, walk into the arms of China, simply because it might make strategic sense.

Such ideas can also appear tempting to some European leaders.And this is not an entirely new line of thinking. Strategic reflections of this kind have been present in Europe for years.

However, such a development would play directly into China’s hands and could ultimately undermine European defence autonomy.

In the end, the entire issue comes down to control over the value chain.

O. Kandyuk: Following the logic you just outlined, do you think the European Green Deal – particularly in the area of energy policy – will survive the current turbulent geopolitical and economic environment? Or is it likely to be scaled back as Europe adjusts to new strategic and security realities?

A. Shapochkina: If Europe truly keeps its strategic priority on rearmament, as it has declared, then in my opinion it will be very difficult to sustain the previous strategic priority on renewable energy at the same time.

The transition toward renewable energy has already taken place to a large extent, and that is what makes the situation complicated. What we are now talking about would almost require a partial reversal of that trajectory.

The contradiction is quite obvious. It is extremely difficult to pursue large-scale rearmament while maintaining the current climate regulations unchanged. Under those regulations, coal production facilities are scheduled to close across Europe – even in countries where coal remains a central part of the energy infrastructure.

Take Poland as an example. Much of the country’s infrastructure is built around coal, and public support for coal-based energy production remains very strong. The same applies across much of Central Europe.

Coal is not only an energy source; it is also a key input in steel production. When we discuss coal in this context, we should think not only about electricity generation but also about the industrial supply chains necessary for defence production.

If current climate regulations remain unchanged, we may see the remaining steel mills in Europe gradually closing within the next decade. Once a coal mine is closed, it cannot simply be reopened later. The mines become flooded and effectively unusable. The infrastructure disappears permanently.

So these two things are connected. If you cut off even one relatively simple element—relatively simple compared to magnets, chips, batteries and all the other components I have just discussed—you are effectively cutting off a part of the value chain. And in this case, it is a relatively simple element, one that you actually have at home and for which you already master the industrial process.

Yes, it is economically unviable. Coal today has indeed become economically unviable in the energy sector. That is absolutely true.

And yes, steel production facilities in Europe and in Great Britain as well are economically unviable. That is also true. So much so that the British government recently had to purchase the last steel mill in the country from its Taiwanese owners in order to keep it operating. From a purely economic standpoint, it simply does not make any sense.

But the British government, however, realized that if this plant were to close, their strategic steelmaking capacity would effectively disappear. It has already declined by roughly 99 percent, and this was the last remaining facility. If it closed, the country would effectively have none left. And Britain is an island. They remember what that means in strategic terms.

So they made a strategic decision to buy the plant, to nationalize the steel mill and keep it operating—not because it makes money, and not because they expect to sell the steel profitably, but because they understand that the strategic context has changed. Today is no longer the time of David Cameron, when the main political objective was cutting defence spending and reducing military capabilities.

This is precisely the kind of realization that political leaders must now reach. It is the first step in understanding the new strategic environment. And once this realization takes place, it becomes immediately clear that the climate policy of yesterday is difficult to reconcile with the defence challenges of tomorrow.

This raises the question of how the Green Deal can continue in its current form. How can Europe continue expanding an energy system that increasingly relies on Chinese batteries—and now also Chinese components in the transportation sector, including electric vehicles? We are talking about Chinese batteries, Chinese solar panels, and to a certain extent Chinese wind turbine equipment.

From a strategic perspective, this increasingly begins to look irrational.

From a purely economic standpoint, of course, there are arguments in favour of these technologies. There are viable business models for renewable energy. And there is a very strong and indisputable climate argument for the development of these technologies.

But from a strategic perspective the picture looks very different.

If tomorrow Europe were to face a situation similar to the one currently unfolding in the Middle East, the consequences could be severe. And believe me, people in the Middle East three weeks ago did not imagine the situation they are facing today. Even in their worst scenarios, very few could have predicted that events would develop in this way.

The entire development model of countries such as the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and Qatar is built on the assumption of long-term security. If security disappears, their entire model collapses.

We are not even talking about the Strait of Hormuz or global energy flows. Even if we focus only on internal stability – the safety of their own cities, their financial markets, and their broader economic ambitions – the same logic applies.

And this raises a fundamental question: can we really assume that such a situation could never happen  in Europe?

We are talking about a continent that has already witnessed a large-scale war taking place only a few thousand kilometres away. In some cases the distance is only a few dozen kilometres. In some places it is effectively zero.

Missiles, drones – Shaheds, Gerans, and other systems – are flying over people’s heads. From time to time they even cross into neighbouring territories. Under such circumstances, continuing to rely on strategic dependencies for key industrial inputs risks becoming an exercise in self-deception.

And this is why the Green Deal was a very attractive policy in peacetime. But it becomes a far more dangerous policy in wartime or even in a period of preparation for potential wartime conditions.

 

O. Kandyuk: When analysing hybrid threats, is it now reasonable to speak of the emergence of a “hybrid peace” as a new normality—one in which the boundary between war and peace has largely disappeared?

A. Shapochkina: To be honest, I am no longer sure that the concept of “peace” itself still has a clear meaning in the current environment. Of course, we can say that we are living in peace in the sense that bombs are not falling on most European cities. But beyond that narrow definition, the distinction between war and peace has become extremely blurred.

European institutions and companies experience tens of thousands of cyberattacks every day. Banking systems, transportation networks, and energy infrastructure are constantly targeted. Undersea cables are damaged or cut by vessels linked to Russia or China. Russian military aircraft regularly enter or test European airspace. Submarines operate close to European waters.

Russian political consultants and advisors are actively involved in supporting or influencing electoral campaigns across Europe. These activities are not new. What has changed is that the broader public has become more aware of them. The term “hybrid war” simply attempts to describe this reality.

If one prefers to call it a form of “hybrid peace,” then perhaps that is another way of describing the same phenomenon. But personally I find it increasingly difficult to apply the traditional concept of peace to the current historical period.

O. Kandyuk: Finally, if we look ahead, what are the three or four most plausible scenarios for Ukraine’s European integration?

A. Shapochkina: The most likely scenario, in my view, is that Ukraine will eventually reach a point where formal accession to the European Union becomes less important.

In that scenario, Ukraine would already be deeply integrated into European markets and into the European military-industrial complex. At that point the formal signing of accession documents might no longer be the central issue.

We are not at that stage yet. The accession negotiations continue, and they remain a serious process involving many people working full time on both sides.

However, from my perspective the process increasingly resembles a formal ritual on the European side. I personally do not believe in the full sincerity of Europe’s commitment to enlargement under current political conditions.

This is why I consider the first scenario the most plausible—not because Ukraine prefers it today, but because the European Union itself no longer appears eager to expand.

A second scenario could involve a rapid political decision leading to accession almost overnight. This might happen if Russia were to launch a direct military attack on the European Union and Europe suddenly needed to strengthen its armed forces by integrating Ukraine’s military capabilities.

The third and fourth scenarios are more conventional: negotiations could continue for another ten years and ultimately result in Ukraine joining the European Union or negotiations could continue for ten years and ultimately fail.

Finally, there is a fifth scenario: the possibility that the European Union itself undergoes such profound transformation that the current enlargement framework disappears altogether.

Those are essentially the five scenarios I see.